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The Union Blockade refers to the naval actions between 1861 and 1865, during the American Civil War, in which the Union Navy maintained a massive effort on the Atlantic and Gulf Coast of the Confederate States of America designed to prevent the passage of trade goods, supplies, and arms to and from the Confederacy. Ships that tried to evade the blockade were known as blockade runners, and they were mostly newly built, very high speed ships with small cargo capacity. They were operated by the British (using Royal Navy officers on leave) and ran between Confederate-controlled ports and the neutral ports of Havana, Cuba; Nassau, Bahamas, and Bermuda, where British suppliers had set up supply bases. President Abraham Lincoln proclaimed the blockade on April 19, 1861. His strategy, part of the Anaconda Plan of General Winfield Scott, required the closure of 3,500 miles of Confederate coastline and twelve major ports, including New Orleans, Louisiana and Mobile, Alabama, the top two cotton-exporting ports prior to the outbreak of the war, as well as the Atlantic ports of Richmond, Virginia, Charleston, South Carolina, Savannah, Georgia, and Wilmington, North Carolina. To this end, he commissioned 500 ships, which eliminated about 1,500 blockade runners over the course of the war; nonetheless, five out of six ships evading the blockade were successful. The blockade runners carried only a small fraction of the usual cargo. Thus, Confederate cotton exports were reduced 95% from 10 million bales in the three years prior to the war to just 500,000 bales in the blockade period. Proclamation of blockade and legal implications On April 19, 1861, President Lincoln issued a Proclamation of Blockade Against Southern Ports: "Whereas an insurrection against the Government of the United States has broken out in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, and the laws of the United States for the collection of the revenue cannot be effectually executed therein comformably to that provision of the Constitution which requires duties to be uniform throughout the United States: Recognition of the Confederacy? Some have contended that the announcement of a blockade carried de facto recognition of the Confederate States of America as an independent national entity, as countries do not blockade their own ports, but rather close them. Under international law and maritime law, however, nations had the right to search neutral vessels on the open sea if they were suspected of violating a blockade, something port closures would not allow. In an effort to avoid conflict between the United States and Britain over the searching of British merchant vessels thought to be trading with the Confederacy, the Union needed the privileges of international law that came with the declaration of a blockade. Under the Declaration of Paris, 1856, international law held that a blockade must be (1) formally proclaimed, (2) promptly established, (3) enforced, and (4) effective, in order to be legal. International legal status of the South However, by effectively declaring the Confederate States of America to be belligerents rather than insurrectionists (who under international law would not be legally eligible for recognition by foreign powers), Lincoln opened the way for European powers such as Britain and France to recognize the Confederacy. Britain's proclamation of neutrality was consistent with the position of the Lincoln Administration under international law - the Confederates were belligerents - giving them the right to obtain loans and buy arms from neutral powers - and giving the British the formal right to discuss openly which side, if any, to support. Operation of the Blockade In the initial phase of the blockade, Union forces concentrated on the Atlantic coast, gradually extending its reach into the Eastern Gulf of Mexico and the Texas coastline. Important Confederate ports included Galveston and Sabine Pass, Texas. Apalachicola, Florida, received Confederate goods travelling down the Chattahoochee River from Columbus, Georgia, and was an early target of Union blockade efforts on Florida's Gulf Coast. Union Navy Both at the time of the war and in subsequent historical analysis, the concept of the blockade met with harsh criticism. The United States Navy, with a strength of only 90 vessels, of which half were sailing ships was grossly inadequate for the task at hand, but the Union quickly attempted to correct this deficiency. In 1861, nearly 80 steamers and 60 sailing ships were brought into service, and the number of blockading vessels rose to 160. While as noted above, a large proportion of blockade runners did manage to evade the Union ships, as the blockade matured, the type of ship likeliest to find success in evading the naval cordon was a small, light ship with a short draft—qualities that facilitated blockade running but were poorly suited to carrying large amounts of heavy weaponry, metals, and other supplies badly needed by the South. To be successful in helping the Confederacy, a blockade runner had to make many trips; sooner or later most were captured or sank. Blockade service Blockade service was attractive to seamen and landsmen alike. Blockade stations were the most boring job in the war--but also the most attractive. The task was for the fleet to sail back and forth to intercept any blockade runners. Over 50,000 volunteered for the boring duty, because food and living conditions on ship were much better than the infantry offered, it was safer, and especially because of the real (albeit small) chance for big money. Captured ships and their cargoes were sold at auction and the proceeds split among the sailors. When the USS Aeolus seized the hapless blockade runner Hope off Wilmington in late 1864, the captain won $13,000, the chief engineer $6,700, the seamen over $1,000 each, and the cabin boy $533, rather better than infantry pay of $13 a month for the lucky sailors. The amount ganred for blockade runners widely varied. While the little Alligator sold for only $50, bagging the Memphis in a morning's work was like winning the lottery—it brought in $510,000 (about what 40 civilian workers could earn in a lifetime of work.) In four years, $25 million in prize money was awarded. Blockade runners Ordinary ships were too slow and visible to escape the Navy. The blockade runners therefore relied mainly on new ships built in England with low profiles, shallow draft and high speed. Their paddle-wheels, driven by steam engines that burned smokeless anthracite coal, could make 17 knots. Since the South lacked sailors, skippers and shipbuilding capability, the runners were built, officered and manned by Brits. Private British investors spent perhaps £50 million on the runners ($250 million in US dollars, equivalent to about $2.5 billion in 2006 dollars). The pay was amazingly high: a Royal Navy officer on leave might earn several thousand dollars (in gold) in salary and bonus per round trip, with ordinary seamen getting several hundred dollars. On dark nights they ran the gauntlet to and from the British islands of Bermuda and the Bahamas, or Havana, Cuba, (Spanish), 500-700 miles away. They carried several hundred tons of compact, high-value cargo--such as cotton, turpentine or tobacco outbound, and rifles, medicine, brandy, lingerie and coffee inbound. They charged from $300 to $1000 per ton of cargo brought in; two round trips a month would generate perhaps $250,000 in revenue (and $80,000 in wages and expenses). In November 1864, a wholesaler in Wilmington asked his agent in the Bahamas to stop sending so much chloroform; please send instead "essence of cognac" because that perfume would sell "quite high." Confederate patriots held Rhett Butler-types and the other nouveau riche blockade runners in contempt for profiteering on luxuries while Lee's soldiers were in rags. On the other hand, their bravery and initiative was necessary for the nation's survival, and many women in the back country flaunted imported $10 gew gaws and $50 hats as patriotic proof that the "damn yankees" had failed to isolate them from the outer world. Richmond eventually regulated the traffic, requiring half the imports to be munitions; it even purchased and operated some runners on its own account, and made sure they loaded vital war goods. By 1864 Lee's soldiers were eating imported meat. Blockade running was reasonably safe for both sides. It was not illegal under international law; captured foreign sailors were released, while Confederates went to prison camps. The ships were unarmed (cannon would slow them down), so they posed no danger to the Navy warships. Impact on the Confederacy The Union blockade of the Confederacy was a powerful weapon that ruined the southern economy, at the cost of very few lives. The blockade not only stopped cotton exports, it choked off munitions imports as well. The measure of the blockade's success was not the few ships that slipped through, but the thousands that never tried it. Ordinary freighters stopped calling at southern ports. The interdiction of coastal traffic meant that long-distance travel depended on the rickety railroad system, which never overcame the devastating impact of the blockade. The blockade caused other hardships as well, especially the maldistribution of food. Throughout the war the South produced enough food for civilians and soldiers, but it had growing difficulty in moving surpluses to areas of scarcity and famine. Lee's army, at the end of the supply line, always went short. Occasional bread riots in Richmond and other cities showed that patriotism was not sufficient to satisfy the demands of housewives. Land routes remained open for cattle drovers, but after the Federals seized control of the Mississippi River in summer 1863, it became impossible to ship horses, cattle and swine from Texas and Arkansas to the eastern Confederacy. Never had a major seacoast been so completely shut down; never before had a navy solved the challenge of numbers, vigilance, discipline and replenishment. The blockade was a triumph of the U.S. Navy, and a major factor in winning the war. Confederate response The Confederacy constructed a number of torpedo boats, generally small, fast steam launches equipped with spar torpedoes, to attack the blockading fleet. Some torpedo boats were refitted steam launches, others, such as the ''David'' class, were purpose-built. The torpedo boats tried to attack under cover of night by ramming the spar torpedo into the hull of the blockading ship, then backing off and detonating the explosive. The torpedo boats were not very effective and were easily countered by simple measures such as hanging chains over the sides of ships to foul the screws of the torpedo boats, or encircling the ships with wooden booms to trap the torpedoes at a distance. One historically notable naval action was the attack of the H. L. Hunley a hand-powered submarine launched from Charleston, South Carolina against Union blockade ships. The Hunley made her first and only attack on the night of February 17, 1864, against the USS ''Housatonic''. The Housatonic sank with the loss of 5 crew; the Hunley also sank, taking her crew of 9 to the bottom. Major engagements Early battles in support of the blockade included the Blockade of Chesapeake Bay*, from May to June, 1861, and the Blockade of the Carolina Coast, August-December 1861.* The Battle of Mobile Bay, August 5, 1864, closed the last major Confederate port in the Gulf of Mexico. End of the blockade As the Union fleet grew in size, speed and sophistication, more and more ports came under Federal control. After 1862, only three ports—Wilmington, North Carolina; Charleston, South Carolina; and Mobile, Alabama—remained open for the 75 to 100 blockade runners in business. Charleston was shut down by Admiral John A. Dahlgren's South Atlantic Blockading Squadron in 1863. Mobile Bay was captured in August 1864, by Admiral David Farragut (tied to the rigging of his flagship, he cried out, "Damn the torpedoes! Full steam ahead!"). Blockade runners faced an increasing risk of capture—in 1861 and 1862, one sortie in 9 ended in capture; in 1863 and 1864, one in 3. By war's end, imports had been choked to a trickle as the risk of capture soared to 50% per sortie. Some 1,100 blockade runners were captured (and another 300 destroyed) in the most effective blockade the world had ever seen. British investors frequently made the mistake of reinvesting their profits in the trade; when the war ended they were stuck with useless ships and rapidly depreciating cotton. In the final accounting, perhaps half the investors took a profit, and half a loss. In December 1864, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles sent a force against Fort Fisher, which protected the Confederate's access to the Atlantic from Wilmington, North Carolina, the last open Confederate port.. The first attack failed, but with a change in tactics (and Union generals), the Fort fell in January 1865, closing the last major Confederate port. "The Union victory at Vicksburg, Mississippi, in July 1863 opened up the Mississippi River and effectively cut off the western Confederacy as a source of troops and supplies. The fall of Fort Fisher and the city of Wilmington, North Carolina, early in 1865 closed the last major port for blockade runners, and in quick succession Richmond was evacuated, the Army of Northern Virginia disintegrated, and General Lee surrendered. Thus, most economists give the Union blockade a prominent role in the outcome of the war." (Elekund, 2004) Squadrons of the Union blockade The Union naval ships enforcing the blockade were divided into squadrons based on their area of operation. Gulf Blockading Squadron The Gulf Blockading Squadron was a squadron of the United States Navy in the early part of the War. The squadron was the largest in operation. It was split into the East and West Gulf Blockading Squadrons in early 1862. Commanders West Gulf Blockading Squadron The West Gulf Blockading Squadron was a squadron of the United States Navy during the War. It was tasked primarily with preventing Confederate ships from supplying troops and with supporting Union troops. It was created early in 1862 when the Gulf Blockading Squadron was split between the East and West Gulf Blockading Squadron. Admiral David Farragut's USS ''Hartford'' was the flagship. The squadron was merged into the Gulf Squadron on July 13, 1865. Commanders North Atlantic Blockading Squadron The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron was a squadron of the United States Navy during the War. It was tasked primarily with preventing Confederate ships from supplying troops and with supporting Union troops. It was created when the Atlantic Blockading Squadron was split between the North and South Atlantic Blockading Squadrons on October 29, 1861. After the end of the war, the squadron was merged into the Atlantic Squadron on July 25, 1865. The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron was based at Hampton Roads, Virginia, and was tasked with coverage of Virginia and North Carolina. Commanders Ships South Atlantic Blockading Squadron The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron was a squadron of the United States Navy during the American Civil War. It was tasked primarily with preventing Confederate ships from supplying troops and with supporting Union troops. It was created when the Atlantic Blockading Squadron was split between the North and South Atlantic Blockading Squadrons on 29 October, 1861. After the end of the war, the squadron was merged into the Atlantic Squadron on 25 July, 1865. Notes | |||||||
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