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The Second Sino-Japanese War (July 7, 1937 - September 9, 1945) was a major war fought between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan, both before and during World War II. It ended with the surrender of Japan in 1945. The Japanese invasion was a strategic plan made by the Imperial Japanese Army as part of their large-scale plans to control the Asian mainland. The early manifestations of this plan were commonly known as "China Incidents", and according to Japanese propaganda of the time, were referred to as "incidents" supposedly provoked by China, in order to downplay Japan's illegality in these invasions. The 1931 invasion of Manchuria by Japan is referred to as the Mukden Incident. The last of these was the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, marking the official beginning of full scale war between the two countries. From 1937 to 1941, China fought alone. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Second Sino-Japanese War merged into the greater conflict of World War II.
Nomenclature In Chinese, the war is most commonly known as the War of Resistance Against Japan (), but also known as the Eight Years' War of Resistance (八年抗戰), or simply War of Resistance (抗戰). In Japan, the name is most commonly used due to its neutrality. When the war began in July 1937 near Beijing, the government of Japan used North China Incident (北支事変, Hokushi Jihen), and with the outbreak of war in Central China next month, it was changed to China Incident (支那事変, Shina Jihen). The word incident (事変, jihen) was used by Japan as neither country declared war on each other. Japan wanted to avoid intervention by other countries such as the United Kingdom and particularly the United States, which had been the biggest steel exporter to Japan. Roosevelt would have to impose an embargo due to the Neutrality Acts had the fighting been named a war. In imperial propaganda however, the invasion of China became a "holy war" (seisen), the first step of the hakko ichi'u (eight corners of the world under one roof). In 1940, prime minister Konoe thus launched the League of Diet Members Believing the Objectives of the Holy War. When both sides formally declared war in December 1941, the name was replaced by Greater East Asia War (大東亜戦争, Daitōa Sensō). Although the Japanese government still uses "Shina Incident" in formal documents, because the word ''Shina'' is considered a derogatory word, media in Japan often paraphrase with other expressions like The Japan-China Incident (日華事変 ''Nikka Jihen'', 日支事変 ''Nisshi Jihen'', which were used by media even in the 1930s. Also, the name Second Sino-Japanese War is not usually used in Japan, as the First Sino-Japanese War (日清戦争, Nisshin-Sensō), between Japan and the Qing Empire in 1894 is not regarded to have obvious direct linkage with the second, between Japan and the Republic of China. Background The origin of the Second Sino-Japanese War can be traced to the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, in which China, then under the Qing Dynasty, was defeated by Japan and was forced to cede Taiwan and recognize the independence of Korea in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The Qing Dynasty was on the eve of collapse from internal revolts and foreign imperialism, while Japan had already emerged as a great power through its effective measures at modernization. The Republic of China was founded in 1912, following the Xinhai Revolution which overthrew the Qing Dynasty. However, the nascent Republic was even weaker than before due to the dominance of warlords. The prospect of unifying the nation and repelling imperialism seemed a remote possibility. Some warlords even aligned themselves with various foreign powers in an effort to wipe each other out. For example, warlord Zhang Zuolin of Manchuria openly cooperated with the Japanese for military and economic assistance. It was during the early period of the Republic that Japan became the greatest foreign threat to China. In 1915 Japan issued the Twenty-One Demands to further its political and commercial interests in China. Following World War I, Japan acquired German sphere of influence in Shandong. China under the Beiyang government remained fragmented and unable to resist foreign incursions until the Northern Expedition of 1926-28, launched by the Kuomintang (KMT, or Chinese Nationalist Party) rival government based in Guangzhou. The Northern Expedition swept through China until it was checked in Shandong, where Beiyang warlord Zhang Zongchang, backed by the Japanese, attempted to stop the Kuomintang Army from unifying China. This situation culminated in the Jinan Incident of 1928 in which the Kuomintang army and the Japanese were engaged in a short conflict. In the same year, Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin was also assassinated when he became less willing to cooperate with Japan. Following these incidents, the Kuomintang government under Chiang Kai-shek finally succeeded in unifying China in 1928. Still, numerous conflicts between China and Japan persisted as Chinese nationalism had been on the rise and one of the ultimate goals of the Three People's Principles was to rid China of foreign imperialism. However, the Northern Expedition had only nominally unified China, and civil wars broke out between former warlords and rivalling Kuomintang factions. In addition, the Chinese Communists revolted against the central government. Because of these situations, the Chinese central government diverted much attention into fighting these civil wars and followed a policy of first internal pacification before external resistance. This situation provided an easy opportunity for Japan to further its aggression. In 1931, the Japanese invaded Manchuria right after the Mukden Incident. In 1932, the puppet state Manchukuo was established with the last emperor of China, Puyi, installed as its head of state. Unable to challenge Japan directly, China appealed to the League of Nations for help. The League's investigation was published as the Lytton Report, which condemned Japan for its incursion of Manchuria, and led Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations. From the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, appeasement was the policy of the international community and no country was willing to take an active stance other than a weak censure. Japan saw Manchuria as a limitless supply of raw materials and also as a buffer state against the Soviet Union. Incessant conflicts followed the Mukden Incident. In 1932, Chinese and Japanese soldiers fought a short war in the January 28 Incident. The war resulted in the demilitarization of Shanghai, which forbade the Chinese from deploying troops in their own city. In 1933, the Japanese attacked the Great Wall region, and in its wake the Tanggu Truce was signed, which gave Japan the control of Rehe province and a demilitarized zone between the Great Wall and Beiping-Tianjin region. The Japanese aim was to create another buffer region, this time between Manchukuo and the Chinese Nationalist government whose capital was Nanjing. In addition, Japan increasingly utilized the internal conflicts among the Chinese factions to reduce their strength one by one. This was precipitated by the fact that even some years after the Northern Expedition, the political power of the Nationalist government only extended around the Yangtze River Delta region, and other regions of China were essentially held in the hands of regional powers. Thus, Japan often bought off or created special links with these regional powers to undermine the efforts of the central Nationalist government in bringing greater unity to China. To do this, Japan sought various Chinese traitors for cooperation and helped these men lead some "autonomous" governments that were friendly to Japan. This policy was called the Specialization of North China (), or more commonly known as the North China Autonomous Movement. The northern provinces affected by this policy were Chahar, Suiyuan, Hebei, Shanxi, and Shandong. In 1935, under Japanese pressure, China signed the He-Umezu Agreement, which forbade the KMT from conducting party operation in Hebei and effectively ended Chinese control of North China. In the same year, the Chin-Doihara Agreement was signed and vacated the KMT from Chahar. Thus, by the end of 1935, the Chinese central government had virtually vacated from North China. In its place, the Japanese-backed East Hebei Autonomous Council and the Hebei-Chahar Political Council were established. Invasion of China
Chinese strategy
National Revolutionary Army Main article: National Revolutionary Army The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) throughout its lifespan employed approximately 4,300,000 regulars, in 370 Standard Divisions (正式師), 46 New Divisions (新編師), 12 Cavalry Divisions (騎兵師), 8 New Cavalry Divisions (新編騎兵師), 66 Temporary Divisions (暫編師), and 13 Reserve Divisions (預備師), for a grand total of 515 divisions. However, many divisions were formed from 2 or more other divisions, and many were not active at the same time. Therefore the number of divisions in active service at any given time is much smaller than this. At the start of the war in 1937, there were about 170 NRA divisions. The average NRA division had 4,000-5,000 troops. A Chinese army is roughly the equivalent to a Japanese division in terms of manpower. In addition, the Chinese army was severely understrength due to a general lack of artillery, heavy weapons, and motorized transport. The shortage of military hardware meant that three to four Chinese divisions had the firepower of only one Japanese division. Because of these material constraints, available artillery and heavy weapons were usually assigned to specialist brigades rather than to the general division, which caused more problems as the Chinese command structure lacked precise coordination. The fighting strength of a Chinese division was further reduced with other aspects of warfare, such as intelligence, logistics, communications, and medical services, taken into account. The National Revolutionary Army can be divided roughly into two groups. The first one is the so-called dixi (嫡系, "direct descent") group, which was comprised of divisions trained by the Whampoa military academy and loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, and can be considered the Central Army (中央軍) of the NRA. The second group is known as the zapai (雜牌, "miscellaneous units"), and was comprised of all divisions led by non-Whampoa commanders, and is more often known as the Regional Army or the Provincial Army (省軍). Even though both military groups were part of the National Revolutionary Army, their distinction lies much in their allegiance to the central government of Chiang Kai-shek. Many former warlords and regional militarists were incorporated into the NRA under the flag of the Kuomintang, but in reality they retained much independence from the central government. They also controlled much of the military strength of China, the most notable of them being the Guangxi, Shanxi, Yunnan and Ma Cliques. Main article: Chinese Red Army Although during the war the Chinese Communist forces fought as a nominal part of the NRA, the number of those on the CCP side, due to their guerrilla status, is difficult to determine, though estimates place the total number of the Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army, and irregulars in the Communist armies at 1,300,000. For more information of combat effectiveness of communist armies and other units of Chinese forces see Chinese armies in the Second Sino-Japanese War. Imperial Japanese Army Main article: Imperial Japanese Army The National Revolutionary Army The Central Army possessed 80 Army infantry divisions with approximately 8,000 men each, nine independent brigades, nine cavalry divisions, two artillery brigades, 16 artillery regiments and three armored battalions. The Chinese Navy displaced only 59,000 tonnes and the Chinese Air Force comprised only 600 aircraft. Chinese weapons were mainly produced in the Hanyang and Guangdong arsenals. However, for most of the German-trained divisions, the standard firearms were German-made 7.92 mm Gewehr 98 and Karabiner 98k. The 98 style rifles were often called the "Chiang Kai-shek" rifles. The standard light machine gun was a local copy of the Czech 7.92 mm Brno ZB26. There were also Belgian and French LMGs. Surprisingly, the NRA did not purchase any of the infamous Maschinengewehr 34s from Germany, but did produce their own copies of them. On average in these divisions, there was 1 machine gun set for each platoon. Heavy machine guns were mainly locally-made 1924 water-cooled Maxim guns, from German blueprints. On average every battalion would get one heavy machine gun (about half of what actual German divisions got during the war). The standard sidearm was the 7.63 mm Mauser M1932 semi-automatic pistol, also known as C96. Some divisions were equipped with 37mm PaK 35/36 anti-tank guns, and/or mortars from Oerlikon, Madsen, and Solothurn. Each infantry division had 6 French Brandt 81 mm mortars and 6 Solothurn 20mm autocannons. Some independent brigades and artillery regiments were equipped with Bofors 72mm L/14, or Krupp 72mm L/29 mountain guns. They were 24 Rheinmetall 150mm L/32 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1934) and 24 Rheinmetall 150mm L/30 sFH 18 howitzers (bought in 1936). Infantry uniforms were basically redesigned Zhongshan suits. Leg wrappings are standard for soldiers and officers alike since the primary mode of movement for NRA troops was by foot. The helmets were the most distinguishing characteristic of these divisions. From the moment German M35 helmets (standard issue for the Wehrmacht until late in the European theatre) rolled off the production lines in 1935, and until 1936, the NRA imported 315,000 of these helmets, each with the 12-ray sun emblem of the ROC on the sides. Other equipment included cloth shoes for soldiers, leather shoes for officers and leather boots for high-ranking officers. Every soldier was issued ammunition, ammunition pouch/harness, a water flask, combat knives, food bag, and a gas mask. On the other hand, warlord forces varied greatly in terms of equipment and training. Some warlord troops were notoriously under-equipped, such as Shanxi's Dadao Teams and the Yunnanese army. Some however were highly professional forces with their own air force and navies. The quality of Guangxi's army was almost on par with the Central Army's, as the Guangzhou region was wealthy and the local army could afford foreign instructors and arms. The Muslim Ma Clique to the Northwest was famed for its well-trained cavalry divisions. The Imperial Japanese Army Although Imperial Japan possessed significant mobile operational capacity, it did not possess capability for maintaining a long sustained war. At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War the Japanese Army comprised 17 divisions, each composed of approximately 22,000 men, 5,800 horses, 9,500 rifles and submachine guns, 600 heavy machine guns of assorted types, 108 artillery pieces, and 24 tanks. Special forces were also available. The Japanese Navy displaced a total of 1,900,000 tonnes, ranking third in the world, and possessed 2,700 aircraft at the time. Each Japanese division was the equivalent in fighting strength of four Chinese regular divisions (at the beginning of Battle of Shanghai (1937)). See Also: Stalemate and foreign aid By 1940, the fighting had reached a stalemate. While Japan held most of the eastern coastal areas of China, guerrilla fighting continued in the conquered areas. The Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek struggled on from a provisional capital at the city of Chongqing; however, realizing that he also faced a threat from communist forces of Mao Zedong, he mostly tried to preserve the remaining strength of his army and avoid heavy battle with the Japanese in the hopes of defeating the Communists once the Japanese left. China, with its low industrial capacities and limited experience in modern warfare, could not launch any decisive counter-offensive against Japan. Chiang could not risk an all-out campaign given the poorly-trained, under-equipped, and disorganized state of his armies and opposition to his leadership both within Kuomintang and in China at large. He had lost a substantial portion of his best trained and equipped army defending Shanghai and the remaining troops were used to preserve his army. On the other hand, Japan had suffered tremendous casualties from unexpectedly stubborn resistance from China and already developed problems in administering and garrisoning fallen territories. Neither side could make any swift progress in a manner resembling the fall of France and Western Europe to Nazi Germany. Most military analysts predicted that the Kuomintang could not continue fighting with most of the war factories located in the prosperous areas under or near Japanese control. Other global powers were reluctant to provide any support — unless supporting an ulterior motive — because in their opinion the Chinese would eventually lose the war, and did not wish to antagonize the Japanese who might, in turn, eye their colonial possessions in the region. They expected any support given to Kuomintang might worsen their own relationship with the Japanese, who taunted the Kuomintang with the prospect of conquest within 3 months. Germany and the Soviet Union did provide support to the Chinese before the war escalated to the Asian theatre of World War II. The Soviet Union was helping the Kuomintang government to hinder the Japanese from invading Siberia, thus saving itself from a two front war. In September 1937 the Soviet leadership signed Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and approved Operation Zet. As part of the secret operation Soviet technicians upgraded and handled some of the Chinese war-supply transport. Bombers, fighters, military supplies and advisors arrived, including future Soviet war hero Georgy Zhukov, who won the Battle of Halhin Gol. It also supported the Communists, at least until war with Germany forced her into conserving everything for her own forces. Because of Chiang Kai-shek's anti-communist nationalist policies and hopes of defeating the CCP, Germany provided the largest proportion of Kuomintang arms imports. German military advisors modernized and trained the Kuomintang armies; Kuomintang officers (including Chiang's second son, Chiang Wei-kuo) were educated in and served in the German army prior to World War II. More than half of the German arms exports during its rearmament period were to China. Nevertheless the proposed 30 new divisions equipped with all German arms did not materialize as the Germans sided with the Japanese later in World War II. Other prominent powers, including the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and France, only officially assisted in war supply contracts up to the attack on Pearl Harbor in late 1941, when a significant influx of trained military personnel and supplies boosted the Kuomintang chance of maintaining the fight. Unofficially, public opinion in the United States was becoming favorable to the Kuomintang. At the start of the 1930s, public opinion in the United States had tended to support the Japanese. However, reports of Japanese brutality added to Japanese actions such as the attack on the U.S.S. Panay (the Panay incident) swung public opinion sharply against Japan. By the summer of 1941, the United States had begun to sponsor the American Volunteer Group (later known as the Flying Tigers) to boost Chinese air defenses, though the AVG did not in fact go into combat until after the U.S. and Japan were at war. In addition, the United States began an oil and steel embargo which made it impossible for Japan to continue operations in China without another source of oil from Southeast Asia. This set the stage for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 (8 December west of the 180th meridian). The Pacific War Within a few days of the attack on Pearl Harbor, both the United States and China officially declared war against Japan. Chiang Kai-shek continued to receive supplies from the United States, as the Chinese conflict was merged into the Asian theatre of World War II. However, in contrast to the arctic supply route to the Soviet Union that stayed open most of the war, sea routes to China had long been closed, so between the closing of the Burma Road in 1942 and its re-opening as the Ledo Road in 1945, foreign aid was largely limited to what could be flown in over The Hump. Most of China's own industry had already been captured or destroyed by Japan, and the Soviet Union could spare little from the Eastern Front. So neither Chinese government ever had the supplies and equipment needed to mount a major offensive. Chiang was appointed Allied Commander-in-Chief in the China theater in 1942. General Joseph Stilwell served for a time as Chiang's Chief of Staff, while commanding US forces in the China Burma India Theater. However, relations between Stilwell and Chiang soon broke down, due largely to the corruption and inefficiency of the Chinese government. Stilwell criticised the Chinese government's conduct of the war in the American media, and to President Franklin Roosevelt. Stilwell also wished to assume the supreme command of all Chinese troops, which Chiang vehemently opposed. Chiang was hesitant to deploy more Chinese troops because China already suffered tens of millions of war casualties, and believed that Japan would eventually capitulate to America's overwhelming industrial output and manpower. The Allies thus lost confidence in the Chinese ability to conduct offensive operations from the Asian mainland, and instead concentrated their efforts against the Japanese in the Pacific Ocean Areas and South West Pacific Area, employing an island hopping strategy. Conflicts among China, the United States, and the United Kingdom also emerged in the Pacific war. Winston Churchill was reluctant to devote British troops, the majority of whom were defeated by the Japanese in earlier campaigns, to reopen the Burma Road. On the other hand, Stilwell believed that the reopening of the Burma Road was vital to China as all the ports on mainland China were under Japanese control. Chiang and his associates also distrusted the intentions of the United Kingdom. Churchill's "Europe First" policy obviously did not sit well with Chiang. Furthermore, the later British insistence that China send in more and more troops into Indochina in the Burma Campaign, was regarded as an attempt by Great Britain to use Chinese manpower to secure Britain's colonial holdings in Southeast Asia and the gate to India from falling to Japan. Chiang also believed that China should divert its troops to eastern China to defend the airbases of the American bombers, a strategy that Claire Chennault supported. In addition, Chiang voiced his support of Indian Independence in a meeting with Mahatma Gandhi in 1942, which further soured the relationship between China and the United Kingdom. The United States saw the Chinese theater as a means to tie up a large number of Japanese troops, as well as being a possible location for American airbases. In 1944, as the Japanese position in the Pacific was deteriorating fast, they launched Operation Ichigo to attack the airbases which had begun to operate. This brought the Hunan, Henan, and Guangxi provinces under Japanese administration. Nevertheless the Japanese prospect of transferring their troops to fight the Americans was in vain and they only committed the Guandong Army from Manchuria in their "Sho plan", which later facilitated the Soviet advancement after the Soviet war declaration on August 8 1945. Casualties assessment The conflict lasted for 97 months and 3 days (measured from 1937 to 1945). Chinese casualties Japanese casualties The Japanese recorded around 1.1 million military casualties, killed, wounded and missing. There were a lot of various claims about the Japanese casualties. The official death-toll according to the Japan defense ministry was only about 200 thousand. But this is believed to be highly unlikely-- the number is far too small. The Chinese (both the communists and nationalists) claimed to have at most killed 1.77 million of Japanese soldiers during the 8-year-war but it would be an exaggeration. Aftermath
Legacy
Who fought the War of Resistance? The question as to which political group directed the Chinese war effort and exerted most of the effort to resist the Japanese still remains a controversial issue. In the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan Memorial near the Marco Polo Bridge and in mainland Chinese textbooks, the People's Republic of China claims that it was the Communist Party that directed Chinese efforts in the war and did everything to resist the Japanese invasion. Recently, however, with a change in the political climate, the CCP has admitted that certain Nationalist generals made important contributions in resisting the Japanese. The official history in mainland China is that the KMT fought a bloody, yet indecisive, frontal war against Japan, while it was the CCP that engaged the Japanese forces in far greater numbers behind enemy lines. This emphasis on the CCP's central role is partially reflected by the PRC's labeling of the war as the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese War of Resistance rather than merely the War of Resistance. According to the PRC official point of view, the Nationalists mostly avoided fighting the Japanese in order to preserve its strength for a final showdown with the Communists. However, for the sake of Chinese reunification and appeasing the ROC on Taiwan, the PRC has now "acknowledged" that the Nationalists and the Communists were "equal" contributors because the victory over Japan belonged to the Chinese people, rather than to any political party. Leaving aside Nationalists sources, scholars researching third party Japanese and Soviet sources have documented quite a different view. Such studies claim that the Communists actually played a miniscule involvement in the war against the Japanese compared to the Nationalists and used guerilla warfare as well as opium sales to preserve its strength for a final showdown with the Kuomintang. This is congruent with the Nationalist viewpoint, as demonstrated by history textbooks published in Taiwan, which gives the KMT credit for the brunt of the fighting. According to these third-party scholars, the Communists were not the main participants in any of the 22 major battles, most involving more than 100,000 troops on both sides, between China and Japan. Soviet liaison to the Chinese Communists Peter Vladimirov documented that he never once found the Chinese Communists and Japanese engaged in battle during the period from 1942 to 1945. He also expressed frustration at not being allowed by the Chinese Communists to visit the frontline, although as a foreign diplomat Vladimirov may have been overly optimistic to expect to be allowed to join Chinese guerrilla sorties. The Communists usually avoided open warfare (the Hundred Regiments Campaign and the Battle of Pingxingguan are notable exceptions), preferring to fight in small squads to harass the Japanese supply lines. In comparison, right from the beginning of the war the Nationalists committed their best troops (including the 36th, 83rd, 88th divisions, the crack divisions of Chiang's Central Army) to defend Shanghai from the Japanese, a third of whom were killed or wounded. The Japanese considered the Kuomintang rather than the Communists as their main enemy and bombed the Nationalist wartime capital of Chongqing to the point that it was the most heavily bombed city in the world to date. Also, the main bulk of Japanese forces were fighting mainly in Central and Southern China, away from major Communist strongholds such as those in Shaanxi. A third perspective advocated by some historians is that the former warlords actually did most of the fighting with the Japanese, considering that a large part the National Revolutionary Army was actually composed of troops from different factions. Chiang Kai-shek's Central Army sustained heavy casualties in the beginning of the war in Shanghai-Nanjing campaigns and his military strength was never to recover to pre-war levels. This situation forced Chiang to rely on other divisions of the National Revolutionary Army. These non-Whampoa divisions, also known as the "provincial army," were nominally part of the National Revolutionary Army but in reality had their own command structures. Some major engagements after the initial 1937 campaigns, such as Battle of Xuzhou and the Battle of Changsha were fought by former warlords under the banner of the Kuomintang. Major figures China: Nationalist China: Communist Japan Others Military engagements Campaigns Battles Battles with articles. Flag shows victorious side in each engagement. Date shows beginning date except for the 1942 battle of Changsha, which began in Dec. 1941. Japanese invasion and planned operations List of Japanese political and military incidents Battles in Burma Campaign Attacks on civilians Footnotes See also | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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