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The Pacific War was the part of World War II — and preceding conflicts — that occurred in the Pacific Ocean, its islands, and in East Asia, between July 7, 1937, and August 14, 1945. The most decisive actions took place after the Empire of Japan attacked various countries, later known as the Allies (or Allied powers), on or after December 7, 1941, including an attack on United States forces at Pearl Harbor. While the term Taiheiyō Sensō ("Pacific War") is also used in the Japanese language, Japanese people also use the term Dai Tō-A Sensō ("Greater East Asia War").
Participants The main Allied participants were the United States, China, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Canada, and Mexico. Many other countries also took part, including forces from British Commonwealth states, especially the Indian Empire. The Soviet Union fought a short, undeclared border conflict with Japan in 1939, then remained neutral until August 1945, when it joined the Allies and invaded Manchukuo. The Axis states which assisted Japan included the Japanese puppet states of Manchukuo and the National Government of China (which controlled the coastal regions of China). Thailand joined the Axis powers under duress. Japan enlisted many soldiers from its colonies of Korea and Taiwan. German and Italian naval forces operated in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Theatres of the Pacific War Between 1942 and 1945, there were four main theatres in the Pacific War, corresponding with and defined by the major Allied commands in the war against Japan: China, the Pacific Ocean theatre, the South East Asian theatre and the South West Pacific theatre. It should be noted that U.S. sources often refer to two major theaters within the Pacific War: the Pacific Theater of Operations (PTO) and the China Burma India Theater (CBI). In the PTO, the U.S. military divided operational control of its forces between two Allied supreme commands known as Pacific Ocean Areas and Southwest Pacific Area. U.S. forces operating in the CBI were technically under the operational command of either the Allied South East Asia Command or that of China's Generalissimo, Chiang Kai Shek. For brief periods in both 1939 and 1945, there was another theater: Mongolia and north-east China, where Soviet and Korean nationalist forces also engaged Japan. Conflict between Japan and China The roots of the war began in the late 18th century with China in political chaos and Japan rapidly modernizing. Over the course of the late 18th century and early 19th century, Japan intervened and finally annexed Korea and expanded its political and economic influence into China, particularly Manchuria. This expansion of power was aided by the fact that by the 1910s, China had fragmented into warlordism with only a weak and ineffective central government. However, the situation of a weak China unable to resist Japanese demands appeared to be changing toward the end of the 1920s. In 1927, Chiang Kai-Shek and the National Revolutionary Army of the Kuomintang led the Northern Expedition. Chiang was able to defeat the warlords in southern and central China, and was in the process of securing the nominal allegiance of the warlords in northern China. Fearing that Zhang Xueliang (the warlord controlling Manchuria) was about to declare his allegiance for Chiang, the Japanese staged the Mukden Incident and set up the puppet state of Manchukuo. The nominal Emperor of this puppet state is better known as Henry Pu Yi of the Qing Dynasty. Japan's imperialist goals in China were to maintain a secure supply of natural resources and to have puppet governments in China that would not act against Japanese interests. Although Japanese actions would not have seemed out of place among European colonial powers in the 19th century, by 1930, notions of Wilsonian self-determination meant that raw military force in support of colonialism was no longer seen as appropriate behavior by the international community. Hence, Japanese actions in Manchuria were roundly criticized and led to Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. During the 1930s, China and Japan reached a stalemate with Chiang focusing his efforts at eliminating the Communists, whom he considered to be a more fundamental danger than the Japanese. The influence of Chinese nationalism on opinion both in the political elite and the general population rendered this strategy increasingly untenable. Meanwhile, in Japan, a policy of assassination by secret societies and the effects of the Great Depression had caused the civilian government to lose control of the military. In addition, the military high command had limited control over the field armies who acted in their own interest, often in contradiction to the overall national interest. There was also an upsurge in Japanese nationalism and Anti-European feeling, including the development of a belief that Japanese policies in China could be justified by racial theories. One popular idea was that Japan and not China was the true heir of classical Chinese civilization. The Sino-Japanese War See the full article on the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) In 1936, Chiang was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang in the Xian Incident. As condition of his release, Chiang agreed to form a united front with the communists and fight the Japanese. In response to this, officers of the Japanese Kwantung Army, manufactured the Battle of Lugou Bridge (also known as the "Marco Polo Bridge Incident") on July 7, 1937, which succeeded in provoking a war between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan, the Sino-Japanese War. In 1939 Japanese forces tried to push into the Soviet Far East from Manchuria. They were soundly defeated in the Battle of Halhin Gol by a mixed Soviet and Mongolian force led by Georgy Zhukov. This stopped Japanese expansion to the North and Japan and the Soviet Union kept uneasy peace until 1945. Japan's policies in the 1930s are remarkable for their disastrously self-defeating nature. Japan's grand strategy was based on the premise that it could not survive a war against the European powers without secure sources of natural resources, yet to secure those resources it decided to undertake the war that it knew it could not win in the first place. Moreover, Japanese actions such as its brutality in China, and its practice of first setting up, and then undermining puppet governments in China, were clearly antithetical to Japan's overall goals, and yet the country persisted in them anyway. Finally, this march to self-destruction is remarkable in that many individuals within the Japanese political and military elite realized these self-destructive consequences, but were unable to do anything about the situation. Also, there appears to have been no debate over policy alternatives which might have enabled Japan to further its goals in China. In addition, throughout the 1930s Japan succeeded in alienating public opinion in the West, particularly the United States. During the early 1930s, public opinion in the United States had been neutral; however, news reports of Japanese brutality, such as the Nanjing Massacre caused American public opinion to swing against Japan, as did events such as the Panay incident. War spreads in the East By 1941, Japan was in a stalemate in China. Although Japan had occupied much of north and central China, the Kuomintang had retreated to the interior setting up a provisional capital at Chongqing while the Communist Party of China remained in control of base areas in Shaanxi. In addition, Japanese control of north and central China was somewhat tenuous, in that Japan was usually able to control railroads and the major cities, but did not have a major military or administrative presence in the vast Chinese countryside. The Japanese found that its aggression against the retreating and regrouping Chinese army was stalled by the mountainous terrain in southwestern China while the Communists organized widespread guerrilla and saboteur activities in eastern and central China behind the Japanese frontline. Japan sponsored several puppet governments, one of which was headed by Wang Jingwei. However, its policies of brutality toward the Chinese population, of not yielding any real power to the governments, and of support to several competing governments failed to make any of them a popular alternative to Chiang's government. Japan was also unwilling to negotiate directly with Chiang, nor was it willing to attempt to create splits in united front against it, by offering concessions that would make it a more attractive alternative than Chiang's government to the former warlords in Chiang's government. Although Japan was deeply mired in a quagmire, Japan's reaction to its situation was to turn to increasingly more brutal and depraved actions in the hope that sheer terror, including massive use of chemical and biological weapons against civilians and use of living civilians for medical and chemical experiments, would break the will of the Chinese population. This, however, only had the effect of turning world public opinion against it. In an effort to discourage Japan's war efforts in China, the United States, Britain, and the Dutch government in exile (still in control of the oil-rich Dutch East Indies) stopped selling oil and steel to Japan. Japan saw this as an act of aggression, as without these resources Japan's military machine would grind to a halt. On December 8, 1941, Japanese forces attacked the British crown colony of Hong Kong, the International Settlement in Shanghai, the Philippines, which was then a United States Commonwealth; Japan also used Vichy French bases in French Indochina to invade Thailand, then using the gained Thai territory to launch an an assault against Malaya. At the same time, technically on December 7 due to the difference in time zones, Japanese carrier-based planes launched a massive air attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. More than 2,400 people were killed, 3 battleships and 2 destroyers were sunk, among many other losses. Although Japan knew that it could not win a sustained and prolonged war against the United States, it was the Japanese hope that, faced with this sudden and massive defeat, the United States would agree to a negotiated settlement that would allow Japan to have free reign in China. This calculated gamble did not pay off; the United States refused to negotiate. Furthermore, the American losses were less serious than initially thought; the American carriers were out at sea while vital base facilities like the fuel oil storage tanks, whose destruction could have crippled the whole Pacific Fleet's operating capacity by itself, were left untouched. The United States enters the war
Japanese offensives, 1941-42
The Allies re-group In early 1942, the governments of smaller powers began to push for an inter-governmental Asia-Pacific war council, based in Washington D.C.. A council was established in London, with a subsidiary body in Washington. However the smaller powers continued to push for a US-based body. The Pacific War Council was formed in Washington on April 1, 1942, with a membership consisting of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his key advisor Harry Hopkins, and representatives from Britain, China, Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Canada. Representatives from India and the Philippines were later added. The council never had any direct operational control and any decisions it made were referred to the US-British Combined Chiefs of Staff, which was also in Washington. Allied resistance, at first symbolic, gradually began to stiffen. The Doolittle Raid in April 1942 was a token but morale-boosting air attack on Japan, and although the Allied navies were narrowly defeated in tactical terms at the Battle of the Coral Sea, it still managed to derail a Japanese naval attack on Port Moresby, New Guinea. Japanese land forces continued to advance. A few Australian Militia (reserve) battalions, many of them very young and untrained, fought a stubborn rearguard action in New Guinea, against a Japanese advance along the Kokoda Track, towards Port Moresby, over the rugged Owen Stanley Ranges. The Militia, worn out and severely depleted by casualties, were relieved in late August by regular troops from the Second Australian Imperial Force, returning from action in the Middle East. Midway: the turning point in 1942 The crucial Battle of Midway followed in June, 1942. Tokyo made the basic strategic mistake of trying to hold all the vast new territory they had just gained, even though they lacked the pilots, carriers, tankers and transport ships necessary to defend and sustain it. They decided on additional attacks in both the south and central Pacific. While Yamamoto had taken advantage of surprise in December, the American codebreakers now turned the tables. They discovered an attack was imminent against "MO"--Port Moresby, New Guinea--and Nimitz rushed the CV Lexington to join the CV Yorktown task force. The result was the indecisive Battle of Coral Sea, the first of the great carrier duels as the two fleets never came within sight. Industrial strength was already beginning to tell: the superior American repair system permitted Nimitz to recover faster and get maximum use out of his ships, and his pipeline of new warships, planes and pilots was much fuller than Yamamoto's. In May US intelligence figured out that Yamamoto was planning a major attack on Midway Island. Yamamoto planned to trick Nimitz into splitting his fleet, gaining tactical advantage. Nimitz had only two carriers, the Enterprise and Hornet. Another carrier, the Saratoga was on the West Coast, under repair; by mistake it was delayed and arrived after the battle ended. Admiral King was finally rushing the carrier Wasp in from the Atlantic, but it also came too late. The Lexington had been sunk at Coral Sea, where the Yorktown was badly damaged. It needed three months' worth of repairs; the repairs were done in three days and the Yorktown steamed into battle with civilian work crews still aboard. Yamamoto mistakenly assumed that Nimitz had only one or two carriers, not three, and thus Japan had numerical superiority in the air. He also assumed he had the advantage of surprise. To trick the Americans, Yamamoto split his fleet, with a large force sent north to attack the Aleutian Islands off Alaska. They were intended to decoy away American forces. Then Yamamoto planned to invade Midway and station more planes there. They and his combined fleet would then destroy Nimitz's remaining carriers once and for all. However, American codebreakers were able to trick Japan into revealing that Midway was the true target. Nagumo was again in tactical command, but he never fully understood Yamamoto's complex plan, nor the strategy that destruction of the American carriers had priority over capturing Midway. Nagumo's indecision in moving from one target to another, together with his ignorance of American forces, sloppy ship handling and careless safety procedures, negated the strength of his powerful fleet. At the decisive hour Nagumo had 272 planes, and the Americans had 348 (of which 115 were land-based.) American reconnaissance planes identified the arrival of the Japanese fleet, exactly on schedule. However the American attacks were poorly coordinated. Land based planes failed to score a single hit; half were lost. At 0920 the Hornets torpedo bombers attacked; Zero fighters shot down all 15. Fifteen minutes later the Enterprise's 15 torpedo bombers skimmed in over the water; 14 were shot down, as the Zero proved its superiority to the lumbering Devastator. Nagumo sensed he was about to score a victory even greater than his triumph at Pearl Harbor, but he had already made critical errors. His combat air patrol fighters were now all at low altitude; they could not protect against a high-level attack. His four carriers had maneuvered out of formation, making their anti-aircraft fire less concentrated. Most dangerous of all, he changed the rearming orders twice, wasting precious time and leaving all his flight decks simultaneously crowded with planes refueling and rearming. The gasoline and high explosive bombs were undefended for only a few minutes; he figured in five minutes his planes would be launched and the risk would pass. Nagumo did not get the five minutes. Dive bombers from the Enterprise and Yorktown suddenly appeared at 10,000 feet, and the Zeroes at sea level were helpless. They zoomed down unerringly at the four carriers. Sōryū, Kaga and Akagi burst into flames. Hiryū was spared, and it launched planes which heavily damaged the Yorktown (later sunk by submarine I-168), but a few hours later it followed the other three Japanese carriers. Yamamoto's four extra carriers, which were anyway too slow to keep up with the Combined Fleet, never got into action. He still had enormous superiority in terms of heavy guns, but that was irrelevant because the Americans now had air superiority (from land-based planes on Midway and from the two surviving carriers) and could refuse a surface gunfight. He therefore retreated and Spruance, always a cautious man, decided not to pursue. The tide had turned, and Japan's ultimate destruction was now inevitable. Guadalcanal and New Guinea
Stalemate in South-East Asia & China In late 1942 and early 1943, British Commonwealth forces were counter-attacking in Burma, albeit with limited success. In August 1943, the western Allies formed a new South East Asia Command (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibilities for the theatre from the British India Command, under Wavell. In October 1943, Churchill appointed Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as Supreme Allied Commander, SEAC. General William Slim was commander of Commonwealth land forces and directed the Burma Campaign. General Joseph Stilwell commanded U.S. forces in the CBI Theater, directed aid to China and assisted in the coordination of Chinese operations. In China, Japan launched a masssive invasion across the mainland codenamed Operation Ichigo, This attack, the biggest in several years, gained much ground for Japan before stopped in Guangxi. On November 22, 1943 U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and ROC leader Chiang Kai-Shek met in Cairo, Egypt, to discuss strategy to defeat Japan. U.S. offensives in the Pacific Ocean theatre, 1943-44
Battle of Leyte Gulf 1944
Submarines strangle Japanese economy American submarines played a major role in defeating Japan. The "silent service" made up less than 2% of the US Navy, and yet it claimed a major share of the victory. It strangled Japan by sinking its merchant marine, intercepting many troop transports and cutting off nearly all the oil imports that were essential to warfare. By early 1945 the oil tanks were dry. US submarines accounted for 56% of the Japanese merchantmen sunk; most of the rest were hit by planes at the end of the war, or were taken out by mines. Submariners claimed 28% of the Japanese warships that were destroyed. Furthermore they played important reconnaissance roles, as at Philippine Sea as well as Leyte Gulf when they gave accurate and timely warning of the approach of the Japanese fleet. To get into position to do that damage, the submarines had to operate from secure bases in Perth (Australia) and Pearl Harbor, and later Guam, which in turn had to be protected by the surface fleet. (Oddly, the Japanese never attacked the forward submarine base at Perth, Australia.) Therefore the submarines' performance cannot be judged in isolation--they could not have done much damage if they had had to operate out of San Francisco. The submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for the enemy to attack. Within hours of Pearl Harbor Roosevelt ordered a new doctrine into effect: unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. Sink without warning and without help to survivors any warship, commercial vessel or passenger ship located in 8 million square miles of ocean. The President thus completely reversed America's long-standing opposition to unrestricted submarine warfare. Woodrow Wilson had declared war on Germany in 1917 for following the doctrine Roosevelt now adopted. (Roosevelt had been Wilson's Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and knew more about unrestricted submarine warfare than anyone else in Washington.) As late as 1935 Roosevelt had signed treaties to outlaw unrestricted attacks on merchant ships. After Pearl Americans insisted this was to be a war to the death, with no holds barred, no quarter given. After the war, when moralistic doubts about Hiroshima and other raids on civilian targets were loudly voiced, no one ever criticized Roosevelt's submarine policy. The top German admirals, Erich Raeder and Karl Dönitz were charged at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials of violating international law through unrestricted submarine warfare; they were acquitted when they proved that the United States had done the same thing. (However, Raeder and Doenitz were convicted on other counts.) By 1943 the Silent Service had learned how to use its 150 subs to maximum effect. The faulty torpedoes were fixed that fall; unaggressive commanders had been replaced; new teams had trained in wolf-pack attacks; effective shipboard radar was installed. Most important, ULTRA intercepts of radio messages told exactly where the Japanese convoys would be. Since Japan always emphasized offense over defense, its convoys were poorly organized and poorly defended. The number of U.S. submarines on war patrol at any one time increased from 13 in 1942, 18 in 1943, to 43 in late 1944. Half the kills came in 1944 when over 200 subs were operating. By 1945 hunting trailed off because so few targets dared move on the high seas. In all, subs destroyed 1,200 merchant ships. Most were small cargo carriers, but 124 were tankers bringing desperately needed oil from the East Indies. Another 320 were passenger ships and troop transports. At critical stages of the Guadalcanal, Saipan and Leyte campaigns, thousands of Japanese reinforcements were drowned before landing. The passenger ships sometimes carried Allied prisoners of war--thousands of whom were also drowned. Over 200 warships were sunk, ranging from many auxiliaries and destroyers to eight carriers and one battleship. Underwater warfare was especially dangerous; of the 16,000 Americans who went out on patrol, 3,500, or 22% never returned, the highest casualty percentage of any American force in World War II. For every 27 enemy ships that went down, one American sub and 67 sailors were lost. Japan failed badly in its own submarine warfare because of poor doctrine. The US had an unusually long supply-line between the West Coast and the battle fronts; cargo ships spent two months en-route, always prime targets. Japan refused to attack them because of blind obedience to a narrow version of Mahanian doctrine that said wars are won only by fleet battles, never by destroying commerce. This was a misreading of Mahan (who denigrated ordinary commerce, but did not reject attacks on vital military supply lines). Honoring its neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union, Japan ignored the Russian freighters that shipped millions of tons of war supplies from San Francisco to Vladivostok. In 1942 the Japanese fleet subs performed well, knocking out or damaging American warships. By 1943, however, American sonar could spot Japanese submarines, and they were systematically hunted down. Tokyo still refused to try to cut the American supply lines, which would have forced the US to adopt a convoy system in the Pacific, which would reduced the flow of supplies by half. Japan's submarines were instead used to carry rice to island strongholds, like Truk and Rabaul, which had been cut off and were slowly starving. The final stages of the war
Timeline Second Sino-Japanese war Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia and Pacific Pacific War Campaign Burma Campaign New Guinea campaign Aleutian Islands campaign Guadalcanal campaign Solomon Islands campaign Gilbert Islands campaign Marshall Islands campaign Mariana Islands campaign Palau Islands campaign Philippines campaign Ryūkyū Islands campaign Borneo campaign Japan campaign See also | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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