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On the Freedom of the Will was an essay presented to the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences in 1839 by Arthur Schopenhauer as a response to the academic question that they had posed. They had asked "Is it possible to demonstrate human free will from self-consciousness?" Schopenhauer began by analyzing the basic concepts of freedom and self-consciousness. He asserted that there are three types of freedom, namely, physical, intellectual, and moral. According to Schopenhauer, when a person inspects his or her self-consciousness, they find the feeling "I can do whatever I will as long as I am not hindered." But, Schopenhauer claimed that this is merely physical freedom. He asserted "You can do what you will, but in any given moment of your life you can will only one definite thing and absolutely nothing other than that one thing." Therefore, the Royal Society's question has been answered and the answer is "No." On the other hand, when a person observes the external world, they find that any change in a thing was immediately preceded by a change in some other thing. This sequence is experienced as a necessary effect and its cause. Humans experience three types of causes. Every human has a unique way of reacting to motives. This is called a character. It is the nature of the individual will. Human character has four attributes. Virtue cannot be taught. The tendency toward good or evil is the result of inborn character. Are two actions possible to a given person under given circumstances? No. Only one action is possible. Since a person's character remains unchanged, if the circumstances of his life were unchanged, could his life have been different? No. Everything that happens, happens necessarily. Through that which we do, we find out what we are. To wish that some event had not taken place is a silly self-torture, for this means to wish something absolutely impossible. After explaining how acts follow with strict necessity from a given character and its response to different motives, Schopenhauer addressed the question of moral freedom and responsibility. Everyone has a feeling of the responsibility for what they do. They feel accountable for their actions. They are certain that they themselves have done their deeds. In order to have acted differently, a person would have had to be entirely different. Schopenhauer claimed that the necessity of our actions can coexist with the feeling of freedom and responsibility in a way that was explained by Kant. In his Critique of Pure Reason (A533-558) and Critique of Practical Reason (Ch. III), Kant explained this coexistence. When a person has a mental picture of himself as a phenomenon existing in the experienced world, his acts appear to be strictly determined by motives that affect his character. This is empirical necessity. But when that person feels his inner being as a thing-in-itself, not phenomenon, he feels free. According to Schopenhauer, this is because the inner being or thing-in-itself is called will. This word "will" designates the closest analogy to that which is felt as the inner being and essence of a person. When we feel our freedom, we are feeling our inner essence and being, which is a transcendentally free will. The will is free, but only in itself and other than as its appearance in an observer's mind. When it appears in an observer's mind, as the experienced world, the will does not appear free. But because of this transcendental freedom, as opposed to empirical necessity, every act and deed is a person's own responsibility. We have responsibility for our acts because what we are is a result of our inner essence and being, which is a transcendentally free will. We are what our own transcendental will has made us.
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