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    The term Needham-Schroeder protocol can refer to one of two communication protocols intended for use over an insecure network, both proposed by Roger Needham and Michael Schroeder in a paper in 1978. These are:
      The Needham-Schroeder Symmetric Key Protocol, also known as the Needham-Schroeder Symmetric Key Protocol, is based on a symmetric encryption algorithm. It forms the basis for the Kerberos protocol. This protocol aims to establish a session key between two parties on a network, typically to protect further communication.
      The Needham-Schroder Public-Key Protocol, based on Public-key cryptography. This is intended to provide mutual authentication between two parties communicating on a network, but in its proposed form it is insecure.

        Needham-Schroeder protocol
            The Symmetric Protocol
            The Public-key protocol
                Attacks on the protocol
            See also

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    The Symmetric Protocol

    Here, Alice (A) initiates the communication to Bob (B). Also,
      S is a server trusted by both parties
      KAS is a symmetric key known only to A and S
      KBS is a symmetric key known only to B and S

    The protocol can be specified as follows in security protocol notation:

    A
    ightarrow S: A,B,N_A
    Alice sends a message to the server identifying herself and Bob, telling the server she wants to communicate with Bob.

    S
    ightarrow A: _
    The server generates and sends back to Alice a copy encrypted under for Alice to forward to Bob and also a copy for Alice. Since Alice may be requesting keys for several different people, the nonce assures Alice that the message is fresh and that the server is replying to that particular message and the inclusion of Bob's name tells Alice who she is to share this key with.

    A
    ightarrow B: _
    Alice forwards the key to Bob who can decrypt it with the key he shares with the server, thus authenticating the data.

    B
    ightarrow A: _
    Bob sends Alice a nonce encrypted under to show that he has the key.

    A
    ightarrow B: _
    Alice performs a simple operation on the nonce, re-encrypts it and sends it back verifying that she is still alive and that she holds the key.


    The protocol is vulnerable to a replay attack. If an attacker records one run of this protocol, then subsequently learns the value KAB used, she can then replay the message _ to Bob, who will accept it, being unable to tell that the key is not fresh. This flaw is fixed in the Kerberos protocol by the inclusion of a timestamp.

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    The Public-key protocol

    This assumes the use of a public-key encryption algorithm.

    Here, Alice (A) and Bob (B) use a trusted server (S) to distribute public keys on request. These keys are:
      KPA and KSA, respectively public and private halves of an encryption key-pair belonging to A
      KPB and KSB, similar belonging to B
      KPS and KSS, similar belonging to S. (Note this has the property that KSS is used to encrypt and KPS to decrypt).

    The protocol runs as follows:

    A
    ightarrow S: A, B
    A requests B's public keys from S

    S
    ightarrow A: _
    S responds. B's identity is placed alongside KPB for confirmation.

    A
    ightarrow B: _
    A invents NA and sends it to B.

    B
    ightarrow S: B, A
    B requests A's public keys.

    S
    ightarrow B: _
    Server responds.

    B
    ightarrow A: _
    B invents NB, and sends it to A along with NA to prove ability to decrypt with KSB.

    A
    ightarrow B: _
    A confirms NB to B, to prove ability to decrypt with KSA


    At the end of the protocol, A and B know each other's identities, and know both NA and NB. These nonces are not known to eavesdroppers.

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    Attacks on the protocol

    Unfortunately, this protocol is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. If an impostor I can persuade A to initiate a session with him, he can relay the messages to B and convince B that he is communicating with A.

    Ignoring the traffic to and from S, which is unchanged, the attack runs as follows:

    A
    ightarrow I: _
    A sends NA to I, who decrypts the message with KSI

    I
    ightarrow B: _
    I relays the message to B, pretending that A is communicating

    B
    ightarrow I: _
    B sends NB

    I
    ightarrow A: _
    I relays it to A

    A
    ightarrow I: _
    A decrypts NB and confirms it to I, who learns it

    I
    ightarrow B: _
    I re-encrypts NB, and convinces B that he's decrypted it


    At the end of the attack, B falsely believes that A is communicating with him, and that NA and NB are known only to A and B.

    The attack was first described in a 1995 paper by Gavin Lowe. The paper also describes a fixed version of the scheme, referred to as the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol.

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    See also
     
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    Scientus.org Dictionary (Yet Another Wiki) RC : 1.39
    This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License [copyleft]. It uses material from the Wikipedia article "Needham-Schroeder protocol". link