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Background In 1918, by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the new Bolshevik Russian state accepted the loss of sovereignty and influence over Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Belarus and Ukraine (plus parts of Armenia and Georgia) as a concession to the Central Powers. In accordance with the Mitteleuropa-policy, they were designated to become satellite states to, or parts of, the German Empire with dukes and kings related to the German emperor. As a consequence of the German defeat in the autumn of 1918, and not without active support from the allied victors of the World War, most of them became democratic republics, but also proxies for France and the United Kingdom against the Bolsheviks in the Russian Civil War. With the exception of Belarus and Ukraine, all of these countries also became independent and fully sovereign — however, in many cases, independence was followed by civil wars related to the Russian revolution. In the 1920s, fear of Russia and of Communism motivated attempts to foster political cooperation and defense treaties between these so called border states. The European balance of power established at the end of World War I was eroded step by step, from the Abyssinia crisis (1935) to the Munich Agreement (1938). The dissolution of Czechoslovakia signaled increasing instability, as Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and other countries, such as Hungary and Bulgaria, aspired to regain territories lost in the aftermath of World War I. The western democracies, the United Kingdom and France, notional guarantors of the territorial status quo, stood by until the March 1939 destruction of Czechoslovakia, maintaining a policy of "non-intervention" while the Fascist governments of Germany and Italy supported the victorious right-wing rebels in their destruction of the democratic Spanish Republic in the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39. For the Soviet Union, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was a much-needed response to the deterioration of the European security situation in the latter half of the 1930s, as Nazi Germany, aligned with Fascist Italy in the Axis Powers, aimed to reverse the disadvantageous Treaty of Versailles after World War I. In addition, the ongoing Soviet-Japanese Border War of 1939, culminating in the Battle of Halhin Gol, may have been a significant consideration for the Soviets for whom a two-front war was an anathema. The pact may in fact have influenced the Japanese to seek a cease-fire two weeks after the pact's announcement. For its part, the Soviet Union was not interested in maintaining a status quo, which it saw as disadvantageous to its interests, deriving as it did from the period of Soviet weakness immediately following the 1917 October Revolution and Russian Civil War. Soviet leaders adopted the position that conflict between what they characterized as rival imperialist countries was not only an inevitable consequence of capitalism, but would also enhance conditions for the spread of Communism. This strategy worked out well for the victorious Soviets, who spread Communism into eastern Europe after the countries were weakened during World War II. During 1938, the Soviet Union (as well as France) offered to abide by their defensive military alliance with Czechoslovakia in the event of German invasion, but the Czechoslovakian Agrarian Party was so strongly opposed to Soviet troops entering the country that they threatened a civil war might result if they did. The 1935 agreement between the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and France stipulated that Soviet aid could only come to Czechoslovakia if France came to their aid as well. The reluctance of the western democracies to form an anti-fascist alliance with the USSR, and France and the United Kingdom's pact with Hitler signed at Munich, was indicative of a lack of interest from the side of the West to oppose the growing fascist movement, already exemplified by the events of the Spanish Civil War. The Soviets were not invited to the Munich Conference of September 1938, when the French and British Prime Ministers, Daladier and Chamberlain, agreed to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As the French had not honoured their 1924 treaty with the Czechs, the Soviets concluded that their 1935 alliance with France was valueless, and that the West was trying to divert Germany to the East. In March 1939, Hitler's denunciation of the 1934 German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact was taken by the Soviets as a clear signal of Hitler's aggressive intentions. Soviet foreign minister Litvinov, in April, outlined a French, British, Soviet alliance, with military commitment against Fascist powers, but Chamberlain's government procrastinated (partly because the Soviets demanded too much – a guarantee to the Baltic States, complete reciprocity and the right to send troops through Poland). However, Chamberlain, who already on 24 March had, with France, guaranteed the sovereignty of Poland, now on 25 April signed a Pact of Mutual Assistance with Poland. Consequently, Stalin no longer feared that the West would leave the Soviet Union to fight Hitler alone; indeed, if Germany and the West went to war, as seemed likely, the USSR could afford to remain neutral and wait for them to destroy each other. Franco-British negotiations with the Soviet Union Negotiations between the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom for a military alliance against Germany stalled, mainly due to mutual suspicions. The Soviet Union sought guarantees for support against German aggression and recognition of the right of the Soviet Union to interfere against "a change of policy favorable to an aggressor" in the countries along the western Soviet border. Although none of the affected countries had formally asked for protection by the Soviet Union, it nevertheless announced "guarantees for the independence of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Turkey and Greece", the so-called "sanitary cordon" erected between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The British and French feared that this would allow Soviet intervention in neighboring countries' internal affairs even in the absence of an immediate external German threat. However, with the Third Reich now demanding territorial concessions from Poland in the face of Polish opposition, the threat of war was increasing. Although telegrams were exchanged between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union as early as April 1939, the military missions sent by the Western Powers (with a slow transport vessel) did not arrive in Moscow until August 11, and were given no authority to sign a treaty. During the first phase of negotiations that began in April, 1939, Anglo-French side was unwilling to form a formal military alliance as suggested by the USSR. However, the Western leaders gave up soon and suggested military alliance in May. A couple of proposals were made by both sides. On June 2, 1939 Soviet Union submitted its own project, which suggested tripartite military action under three circumstances: This project was discussed for the next two months, until the Western allies eventually accepted it almost completely. Molotov suggested signing the (political) alliance treaty together with the military treaty, for which Western delegations were sent to Moscow. The military negotiations lasted from August 12 to August 17. On August 14, the question of Poland was raised by Voroshilov for the first time. The Polish government rightly feared that the Soviet government sought to annex the disputed territories of Kresy received by Poland in 1920 after the Treaty of Riga ending the Polish-Soviet war. Kresy were characterized by the Kremlin as irredenta — "Western Ukraine" and "Western Belarus". The majority of the population of Eastern Second Polish Republic was non-Polish, just as majority of population of Western Soviet Union was non-Russian, since those areas were inhabited by ethnically Ukrainian and Belarusian majorities. Therefore, the Polish government refused to allow the Soviet military to enter its territory and establish military bases in preparation for the now-inevitable war with Germany — a situation that allegedly left the Red Army without any possibility of confronting the Germans before Poland was invaded. The position was retained even under pressure by the Western allies, who regarded alliance with the Soviet Union necessary and possible. Three weeks into August, the negotiations ground to a halt with each side doubting the other's motives. It should also be noted that Soviets had had contacts with the Germans already throughout spring, 1939. * The Munich Agreement and Soviet foreign policy Defenders of the Soviet position argue that the Soviet Union entered the non-aggression pact after the September 1938 Munich Agreement had made it evident that the western countries were pursuing a policy of appeasement and were not interested in joining the Soviet Union in an anti-fascist alliance promoted through their popular front tactic. In addition, there was concern about the possibility that France and the United Kingdom would stay neutral in a war initiated by Germany, hoping that the warring states would wear each other out and put an end to both the Soviet Union and the Nazis. Biographers of Stalin point out that he believed the British rejected his proposal of an anti-fascist alliance because they were plotting with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union, and that the western democracies were expecting the Third Reich to attack "Communist Russia" and were hoping that the Nazi forces would wipe out the Soviet Union — or that both countries would fight each other to the point of exhaustion and then collapse. These suspicions were reinforced when Chamberlain and Hitler met for the Munich Agreement. The defenders of the Soviet position also argue it was necessary to enter into a non-aggression pact to buy time since the Soviet Union was not in a position to fight a war in 1939, and needed at least three years to prepare. It remains unclear, however, what kind of guarantees for German non-aggression a treaty with Hitler could offer. This argument matches the views of Stalin's critics, who maintain that one reason why the Soviet Union was not in a position to fight a war was Stalin's Great Purge of 1936 to 1938 which, among other things, eliminated much of the military's most experienced leadership. A well-known fact is that when German forces finally did attack the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the Red Army was completely unprepared for the assault, despite multiple advanced warnings from foreign as well as from Soviet intelligence. At this point the defenders of Stalin reply that these military leaders (e.g. Marshal Tukhachevsky) were actually poorly experienced and had no good military records outside of the Soviet Union. On the other hand their elimination made possible the emergence of the next generation of Soviet military leaders (e.g. Marshal Zhukov) who eventually played a central role in the subsequent defeat of Germany. Critics of Stalin question his determination to oppose Germany's growing military aggressiveness, since the Soviet Union began commercial and military cooperation with Germany in 1936 and grew these relationships until the German invasion began. After the British and French declaration of war on Germany, these economic relationships allowed Germany to circumvent the Allied naval blockade, thus allowing it to avoid the disastrous situtation it faced in WW1. Some critics such as Viktor Suvorov, author of numerous scandalous works, claim that Stalin's primary motive for signing the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty was Stalin's calculation that such a pact could result in a conflict between the capitalist countries of Western Europe. This idea is supported by professor Albert L. Weeks. Nazi&Soviet rapprochement
Effects On September 1, barely a week after the pact had been signed, the partition of Poland commenced with the German invasion. The Soviet Union invaded from the east on September 17, practically concluding a fourth partition of Poland and violating the Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact signed in 1932. The pact caused great shock in the Western world among governments which had most feared such an outcome and even more so among the communists themselves, many of whom found these Soviet dealings with their Nazi enemy incomprehensible. A famous cartoon by David Low from the London Evening Standard of 20 September 1939 has Hitler and Stalin bowing to each other over the corpse of Poland, with Hitler saying "The scum of the Earth, I believe?" and Stalin replying "The bloody assassin of the workers, I presume?". At Brest-Litovsk, Soviet and German commanders held a joint victory parade before German forces withdrew westward behind a new demarcation line. And on September 28, 1939 the Soviet Union and German Reich issued a joint declaration in which they declared that they mutually express their conviction that it would serve the true interest of all peoples to put an end to the state of war existing at present between Germany on the one side and England and France on the other. Both Governments will therefore direct their common efforts, jointly with other friendly powers if occasion arises, toward attaining this goal as soon as possible. Should, however, the efforts of the two Governments remain fruitless, this would demonstrate the fact that England and France are responsible for the continuation of the war, whereupon, in case of the continuation of the war, the Governments of Germany and of the U.S.S.R. shall engage in mutual consultations with regard to necessary measures.* The pact also affected the Comintern policies: despite some unwillingness by Western communists (on December 3, CPGB declared the war against Germany 'just'), Moscow soon forced Communist Parties of France and Great Britain to adapt an anti-war position. On September 7 Stalin called Georgi Dimitrov, and the latter sketched a new Comintern's line on the war. The new line -- which stated that the war was unjust and imperialist -- was approved by the secretariat of the Communist International on September 9. Thus, the Communist parties now had to oppose the war, and to vote against war credits. Many French communists (including Maurice Thorez, who fled to Moscow), deserted from the French Army, owing to a 'revolutionary defeatist' attitude taken by Western communist leaders. This anti-war line was in effect for the duration of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, i.e until German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941. On September 28th 1939, the three Baltic States were given no choice but to sign a so-called Pact of defence and mutual assistance, which permitted the Soviet Union to station troops in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The same day a supplementary German-Soviet protocol (German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty, *) had transferred Lithuania's territory (with the exception of left bank of river Sheshupe, which remained in German sphere) from the envisaged German sphere to the Soviet sphere of interest. Finland resisted similar claims, and was attacked by the Soviet Union on November 30. After more than three months of heavy fighting and losses in the ensuing Winter War, the Soviet Union gave up its intended occupation of Finland in exchange for approximately 10% of Finland's territory, most of which was still held by the Finnish army. On June 15–17, 1940, after the Wehrmacht's swift occupation of Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and the defeat of France, it was time for the three Baltic states to be occupied, and soon annexed, by the Soviet Union. Soviets annexed whole Lithuania, including Sheshupe area, which was to be given to Germany. On January 10, 1941, German embassador to Moscow von Schulenburg and Molotov signed another secret protocol: the Lithuanian territories West of river Sheshupe were authorised as Soviet, and Germany was paid 7.5 gold dollars (31.5 million Reichsmark) compensation by the USSR. Finally, on June 26, four days after France accepted its defeat by the Third Reich, the Soviet Union requested in an ultimatum, Bessarabia, Bukovina and the Hertza region from Romania. Alerted about this Soviet move, Ribbentrop had stressed on June 25, in his reply to the Soviet leaders, the strong German "economic interests" (oil industry and agriculture being paramount) in Romania. This ensured that Romanian territory wouldn't be transformed into a battlefield. Additionally, Ribbentrop claimed that this German interest also arose from concern over the "faith" and "future" of 100,000 ethnic Germans of Bessarabia. In September, almost all ethnic Germans of Bessarabia were resettled in Germany as part of the Nazi-Soviet population transfers. With France no longer in a position to be the guarantor of the status quo in Eastern Europe, and the Third Reich pushing Romania to make concessions to the Soviet Union, the Romanian government gave in, following Italy's counsel and Vichy France's recent example. In the month of August 1940, the fear of the Soviet Union, in conjunction with German support for the territorial demands of Romania's neighbors, and the Romanian government's own miscalculations, resulted in more territorial losses for Romania. The Second Vienna Award, orchestrated mainly by Ribbentrop, created a competition between Romania and Hungary for Germany's favour concerning Transylvania. In the end, the territory ceded to Hungary also had a large Jewish community, which suffered deportation by the Hungarian government to Germany in 1944. By September 1940, Romania's economic and military resources were fully dedicated to German interests in the East. Aftermath
Alternative terms The most established term for the treaty is the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This term is, for example, used on more web pages than any other name . However, in the English speaking world, the term Nazi-Soviet Pact has always been popular, and has seemingly gained increasing popularity over time. This term is particularly widely used in journalism and school books on history. However, in some contexts, the term Hitler-Stalin Pact is more common and sometimes dominant: The term Stalin-Hitler Pact can likewise be found in works by authors whose views were colored by anti-Communism and the Cold War. See also Notes | |||||||||||||
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