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"MiG Alley" is the name given by U.S. Air Force pilots to the northwestern portion of North Korea, where the Yalu River empties into the Yellow Sea. During the Korean War, it was the site of numerous dogfights between U.S. fighter jets and those of the Communist forces, particularly the Soviet Union. The F-86 Sabre and the Soviet-built MiG-15 were the aircraft used throughout most of the conflict, with the area's nickname derived from the latter. Because it was the site of the first large-scale jet-vs.-jet air battles, MiG Alley is considered the birthplace of jet fighter combat.
MiGs enter the scene The North Koreans began their war against South Korea on June 25, 1950 with a small, primitive air force of propeller-driven Soviet aircraft of World War II vintage flown by poorly-trained and inexperienced pilots. Once the United States committed its air power to the war, this force was rapidly shot out of the skies. For several months, U.S. F-80 Shooting Star and F-84 Thunderjet fighters, along with B-29 bombers, roamed the skies over North Korea virtually at will while the North Koreans, and their Soviet and Communist Chinese backers, argued behind the scenes over the best course of counter-action. By October, the Soviet Union had agreed to provide regiments of state-of-the-art, Soviet-designed and -built MiG-15 fighters, along with the trained crews to fly them. Simultaneously, the Kremlin agreed to supply the Chinese and North Koreans with their own MiG-15s, as well as training for their pilots. Secrecy For many years, the participation of Soviet aircrews in the Korean War was widely suspected by the United Nations forces, but consistently denied by the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, however, Soviet pilots who participated in the conflict have begun to reveal their role. These subterfuges did not long survive the fury of air-to-air combat, however, and pilots were soon routinely communicating in Russian. Soviet MiG-15 regiments were based on Chinese fields in Manchuria, where, according to existing U.S. rules of engagement, they could not be attacked by U.S. forces. Many Soviet regiments underwent preliminary training at Soviet bases in the neighboring Soviet Maritime Military District. Soviet air defense troops also began to arrive along the Yalu, setting up radar installations, ground control centers, searchlights and large numbers of anti-aircraft guns to deter any attacks on the Chinese airfields. While U.S. pilots chafed at the restrictions imposed on attacking the MiG's Chinese airfields, it wasn't known until many years later that the MiGs themselves operated under tight restrictions. To preserve the fiction that Soviet pilots were not fighting in Korea, MiG pilots were prohibited from flying over non-Communist-controlled territory. (One Soviet pilot who was shot down in UN-controlled territory shot himself with his pistol rather than be taken captive.) Nor could they pursue U.S. aircraft over the U.S.-controlled Yellow Sea. In spite of the restrictions, many U.S. pilots took advantage of a "hot pursuit" exception to flying over China to pursue MiGs across the Yalu River. Later, "hot pursuit" became active MiG hunting over Manchuria, with U.S. pilots maintaining a "code of silence" about the patrols. Air combat The first USAF contact with MiG-15s occurred in November 1950. The inexperienced Soviet pilots initially showed little interest in pressing their attacks. Nevertheless, U.S. pilots quickly realized they were facing a formidable opponent, and the 4th Fighter Interceptor Wing, the only USAF unit equipped with the newer F-86 Sabre, was rushed to Korea. The 4th FIW downed the first MiG-15 on Dec. 17, 1950, with six more following five days later. Despite these early successes, however, the 50 Sabres of the 4th FIW were estimated to be facing as many as 400 MiGs. Worse, the performance of the MiG-15 was superior not only to that of the F-80 and the F-84, it even had a few advantages over the F-86, especially at higher altitudes. By the spring of 1951, the early MiG pilots had gained experience, and they had been augmented by instructor pilots and veteran fliers of "The Great Patriotic War." The air battles that would come to be associated with the name "MiG Alley" could now truly begin. The mission of the Soviet forces was to defeat (or at least deter) large-scale daylight raids on North Korea by U.S. bombers. In this, the MiGs were largely successful. Even with heavier fighter escorts, B-29 losses mounted throughout the spring and summer of 1951, as the MiG pilots learned how to pick off the lumbering, slow-moving bombers. These efforts climaxed with the disastrous "Black Thursday" battle of October 23, 1951, in which an estmated 100 MiG-15s attacked B-29s and their escorts. Three B-29s were shot down, four crash-landed in South Korea and three more were judged to be beyond repair upon returning to base. After that, daylight bombing raids became a rarity, and even night raids could be deadly. On June 10, 1952, four B-29 crews of the 19th Bomb Group found themselves in Soviet searchlights over Kwaksan in the southern end of MiG Alley. Attacked by 12 MiGs, three bombers went down: one exploded in mid-air, one hit the ground in North Korea and one crash-landed at Kimpo Airfied in the South. MiG-15s also began systematic attacks on jet fighter-bombers, which were the backbone of the U.S. effort to interdict railway operations in North Korea. Although outnumbered throughout the conflict, the F-86 Sabre pilots enjoyed advantages they learned to exploit to the fullest. Foremost among these advantages was a radar ranging gunsight on their six .50 caliber machine guns, which ensured that even short bursts of fire generally found their target. F-86 pilots were also equipped with G-suits, which prevented pilot blackout in high-speed turning maneuvers. U.S. training was also superior, with new F-86 pilots being intensively prepared at Nellis Air Force Base outside Las Vegas. Later variants of the F-86, particularly the "F" model, came very close to duplicating the MiG in speed and performance. Employing these advantages, and learning the MiG's weaknesses, enabled U.S. pilots to exact an unequal toll on their opponents. Although dogfights continued until the armistice of July 27, 1953, the fighting in MiG Alley began to abate that spring, particularly after May. There were several likely reasons for this. Following the death of Joseph Stalin in March, the new Soviet leadership might have been signalling the new Eisenhower administration in Washington of a desire to find a way out of the seemingly endless war. Also, in April of that year, the U.S. undertook "Operation Moolah," promising cash payments to any Soviet or Chinese pilot who would defect with a MiG. While no Soviet pilot is known to availed himself of the offer, fear that one or more might do so could have contributed to the apparent Soviet decision to keep their aircraft grounded. Legacy The MiG Alley battles produced many U.S. fighter aces, such as Maj. James Jabara, the first jet-vs.-jet ace; Capt. Joseph C. McConnell, the top U.S. ace of the war, with 16 MiG kills to his credit. (Hollywood immortalized him with ''The McConnell Story'', starring Alan Ladd and June Allyson); Another was Frederick C. "Boots" Blesse, who downed 9 MiG-15s in his F-86 Sabre and later wrote "No Guts, No Glory," a manual of air fighter combat that is still studied today. George Andrew Davis, Jr. became one of the first members of the new Air Force to receive the Medal of Honor while leading a flight in MiG Alley in 1952. Casualties and "kill" totals over MiG Alley remain highly controversial. The Soviets claimed a fantastic 1,200 American planes shot down by the MiGs, a number likely inflated by a factor of 10. (The USAF admits to 78 Sabres destroyed by enemy action.) The F-86 pilots, in turn, claimed 792 MiG-15s shot down, while B-29 gunners claimed a further 16. These numbers have also been challenged as inflated, perhaps by as much as 100 percent. Chinese and North Korean victories and losses must remain a matter for speculation. The Buick LeSabre was named for the F-86 Sabre. 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