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Deterrence theory is a defensive strategy developed after World War I and used throughout the Cold War. It is especially relevant with regard to the use of nuclear weapons, and also figures somewhat in the current War on Terrorism.
Strategy There are two forms of deterrence: deterrence by punishment or deterrence by denial. Deterrence by punishment is a strategy by which governments threaten an immense retaliation if attacked. Aggressors are deterred if they do not wish to suffer such damage as a result of an aggressive action. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) is a form of this strategy. Deterrence by denial is a strategy whereby a government builds up or maintains defence and intelligence systems with the purported aim of neutralising or mitigating attacks. Aggressors are deterred if they choose not to act, perceiving the cost of their action to be too high in relation to its likely success. Deterrence is viewed by some as the opposite of appeasement, where an expansionist government is allowed to absorb some territory to reach a negotiated settlement, (for example, Nazi Germany during World War II, see Munich Agreement). Deterrence can be based on either WMD's, conventional weapons strength, or both. History Deterrence in the Cold War was related to George F. Kennan's ideology of Containment and President Ronald Reagan's arms build-up in the 1980's. They claimed that the Soviet system of political repression and a communist economy would be unable to compete with the American system; the USSR would eventually weaken and collapse. John Foster Dulles elaborated that “The heart of the problem is how to deter attack. This... requires that a potential aggressor be left in no doubt that he or she would... suffer damage outweighing any possible gains from aggression.”* Because the theory suggested that expansion could be prevented by a show of military might, some leaders thought that the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union would prevent both sides from entering into another world war. Criticism Some argue that Deterrence Theory is flawed since a government can misunderstand the rationale of their opponent. A peaceful country with unpopular politics can be unfairly seen as a threat. Also, an isolationist nation that imposes draconian rule over its people can be ignored since it does not directly threaten its neighbors. The arms race during deterrence might escalate the risk of accidental deployment possibly leading to war, as illustrated in the movies WarGames and Dr. Strangelove. The arms race is inefficient in terms of optimal output; all countries involved have to expend resources on armaments which would not be necessary if the others had not expended resources. This could be considered a form of feedback runaway. Finally, a country's military build-up risks massive budget deficits, restrictions on civil liberties, the creation of a military-industrial complex, and other repressive measures that sometimes result from a protracted or endless war. See Garrison State. Proponents insist that the theory is flexible to different situations and allows for changes of strategy. Psychology and deterrence A new form of criticism emerged in the late 1980s with detailed analysies of the actions of individual leaders and groups of leaders in crisis situations (historical and theoretical). A number of new or nuanced criticisms of "traditional" deterrence theory emerged. One was that deterrence theory assumed that both sides had common rational peaceful goals. In some real-life situations, such as the Yom Kippur War, leaders felt that internal or external political considerations forced a conflict. One of the essays in regarding the internal military and political discussions within the Egyptian high command in 1973 indicates that senior civilian leaders including Anwar Sadat believed that they had to fight a war in order to have enough internal political support to negotiate for peace. In another miscalculation, Israel rationalized that the Israeli military dominance would deter any attack, and believed that no rational Syrian or Egyptian leader would attempt such an attack. Sadat felt unable to avoid a war, and Syria's leadership misjudged the military situation and believed they could be victorious. Israel was assuming rational and well informed opponents, and assuming a set of goals for its opponents, and its deterrence failed. Another observation was that crisis situations can reach a point that formerly stabilizing actions (such as keeping military units at bases, and low alert levels) can be seen as a sign of weakness, and that perceived weakness can then induce an opponent to attack during the perceived time of advantage. Thus, an inversion point exists, after which some formerly stabilizing actions become destabilizing, and some formerly destabilizing actions become stabilizing. Finally, studying the specific group psychology of several leaders and leader groups, including the Israeli and Arab leaders in 1973, and the Kennedy Administration during the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis events, indicated that in many cases leader groups use bad decision making techniques and improperly assess available information. These errors can and often do preclude truly rational end behavior in deterrence situations. | ||||||||
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