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History During the classical period, economics had a close link with psychology. For example, Adam Smith wrote an important text describing psychological principles of individual behavior, The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Jeremy Bentham wrote extensively on the psychological underpinnings of utility. Economists began to distance themselves from psychology during the development of neo-classical economics as they sought to reshape the discipline as a natural science, with explanations of economic behavior deduced from assumptions about the nature of economic agents. The concept of homo economicus was developed and the psychology of this entity was fundamentally rational. Nevertheless, psychological explanations continued to inform the analysis of many important figures in the development of neo-classical economics such as Francis Edgeworth, Vilfredo Pareto, Irving Fisher and John Maynard Keynes. Psychology had largely disappeared from economic discussions by the mid 20th century. A number of factors contributed to the resurgence of its use and the development of behavioral economics. Expected utility and discounted utility models began to gain wide acceptance which generated testable hypotheses about decision making under uncertainty and intertemporal consumption respectively, and a number of observed and repeatable anomalies challenged these hypotheses. Furthermore, during the 1960s cognitive psychology began to describe the brain as an information processing device (in contrast to behaviorist models). Psychologists in this field such as Ward Edwards, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman began to benchmark their cognitive models of decision making under risk and uncertainty against economic models of rational behavior. Perhaps the most important paper in the development of the behavioral finance and economics fields was written by Kahneman and Tversky in 1979. This paper, 'Prospect theory: Decision Making Under Risk', used cognitive psychological techniques to explain a number of documented anomalies in rational economic decision making. Further milestones in the development of the field include a well attended and diverse conference at the University of Chicago (see Hogarth & Reder, 1987), a special 1997 edition of the respected Quarterly Journal of Economics ('In Memory of Amos Tversky') devoted to the topic of behavioral economics and the award of the Nobel prize to Daniel Kahneman in 2002 'for having integrated insights from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty. Prospect theory is an example of generalized expected utility theory. Although not commonly included in discussions of the field of behavioral economics, generalized expected utility theory is similarly motivated by concerns about the descriptive inaccuracy of expected utility theory. Behavioral economics has also been applied to problems of intertemporal choice. The most prominent idea is that of hyperbolic discounting, in which a high rate of discount is used between the present and the near future, and a lower rate between the near future and the far future. This pattern of discounting is dynamically inconsistent (or time-inconsistent), and therefore inconsistent with standard models of rational choice, since the rate of discount between time t and t+1 will be low at time t-1, when t is the near future, but high at time t when t is the present and time t+1 the near future. Methodology At the outset behavioral economics and finance theories were developed almost exclusively from experimental observations and survey responses, though in more recent times real world data has taken a more prominent position. fMRI has also been used to determine which areas of the brain are active during various steps of economic decision making. Experiments simulating market situations such as stock market trading and auctions are seen as particularly useful as they can be used to isolate the effect of a particular bias upon behavior; observed market behavior can typically be explained in a number of ways, carefully designed experiments can help narrow the range of plausible explanations. Experiments are designed to be incentive compatible, with binding transactions involving real money the norm. Key observations There are three main themes in behavioral finance and economics (Shefrin, 2002): Market wide anomalies cannot generally be explained by individuals suffering from cognitive biases, as individual biases often do not have a large enough effect to change market prices and returns. In addition, individual biases could potentially cancel each other out. Cognitive biases have real anomalous effects only if there is a social contamination with a strong emotional content (collective greed or fear), leading to more widespread phenomena such as herding and groupthink. Behavioral finance and economics rests as much on social psychology as on individual psychology. There are two exceptions to this general statement. First, it might be the case that enough individuals exhibit biased (ie. different from rational expectations) behavior that such behavior is the norm and this behavior would, then, have market wide effects. Further, some behavioral models explicitly demonstrate that a small but significant anomalous group can have market-wide effects (eg. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Behavioral finance topics Key observations made in behavioral finance literature include the lack of symmetry between decisions to acquire or keep resources, called colloquially the "bird in the bush" paradox, and the strong loss aversion or regret attached to any decision where some emotionally valued resources (e.g. a home) might be totally lost. Loss aversion appears to manifest itself in investor behavior as an unwillingness to sell shares or other equity, if doing so would force the trader to realise a nominal loss (Genesove & Mayer, 2001). It may also help explain why housing market prices do not adjust downwards to market clearing levels during periods of low demand. Applying a version of prospect theory, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) claim to have solved the equity premium puzzle, something conventional finance models have been unable to do. Presently, some researchers in Experimental finance use experimental method, e.g. creating an artificial market by some kind of simulation software to study people's decision-making process and behavior in financial markets. Behavioral finance models Some financial models used in money management and asset valuation use behavioral finance parameters, for example Criticisms of behavioral finance Critics of behavioral finance, such as Eugene Fama, typically support the efficient market theory (though Fama may have reversed his position in recent years). They contend that behavioral finance is more a collection of anomalies than a true branch of finance and that these anomalies will eventually be priced out of the market or explained by appeal to market microstructure arguments. However, a distinction should be noted between individual biases and social biases; the former can be averaged out by the market, while the other can create feedback loops that drive the market further and further from the equilibrium of the "fair price". A specific example of this criticism is found in some attempted explanations of the equity premium puzzle. It is argued that the puzzle simply arises due to entry barriers (both practical and psychological) which have traditionally impeded entry by individuals into the stock market, and that returns between stocks and bonds should stabilize as electronic resources open up the stock market to a greater number of traders (See Freeman, 2004 for a review). In reply, others contend that most personal investment funds are managed through superannuation funds, so the effect of these putative barriers to entry would be minimal. In addition, professional investors and fund managers seem to hold more bonds than one would expect given return differentials. Behavioral economics topics Models in behavioral economics are typically addressed to a particular observed market anomaly and modify standard neo-classical models by describing decision makers as using heuristics and being affected by framing effects. In general, behavioural economics sits within the neoclassical framework, though the standard assumption of rational behaviour is often challenged. Heuristics Prospect theory - Loss aversion - Status quo bias - Gambler's fallacy - Self-serving bias Framing Cognitive framing - Mental accounting - Reference utility - Anchoring Anomalies Disposition effect - endowment effect - equity premium puzzle - money illusion - dividend puzzle -fairness (inequity aversion) - Efficiency wage hypothesis - reciprocity - intertemporal consumption - present biased preferences - behavioral life cycle hypothesis - wage stickiness - price stickiness - Visceral influences - Earle's Curve of Predictive Reliability - limits to arbitrage - income and happiness - momentum investing Criticisms of behavioral economics Critics of behavioral economics typically stress the rationality of economic agents (see Myagkov and Plott (1997) amongst others). They contend that experimentally observed behavior is inapplicable to market situations, as learning opportunities and competition will ensure at least a close approximation of rational behavior. Others note that cognitive theories, such as prospect theory, are models of decision making, not generalized economic behavior, and are only applicable to the sort of once-off decision problems presented to experiment participants or survey respondents. Traditional economists are also skeptical of the experimental and survey based techniques which are used extensively in behavioral economics. Economists typically stress revealed preferences, over stated preferences (from surveys) in the determination of economic value. Experiments and surveys must be designed carefully to avoid systemic biases, strategic behavior and lack of incentive compatibility and many economists are distrustful of results obtained in this manner due to the difficulty of eliminating these problems. Rabin (1998) dismisses these criticisms, claiming that results are typically reproduced in various situations and countries and can lead to good theoretical insight. Other proponents of behavioral economics note that neoclassical models often fail to predict outcomes in real world contexts. Behavioral insights can be used to update neoclassical equations, and behavioral economists note that these revised models not only reach the same correct predictions as the traditional models, but also correctly predict outcomes where the traditional models failed. Key figures George Akerlof - Dan Ariely - Colin Camerer - Ernst Fehr - Daniel Kahneman - Werner Güth - David Laibson - George Loewenstein - Sarah Lichtenstein - Lola Lopes - Matthew Rabin - Robert Shiller - Richard Thaler - Amos Tversky - Paul Slovic - Andrei Shleifer - Hersh Shefrin - Werner De Bondt Non-specialists whose work is important to the field Herbert Simon - Gerd Gigerenzer - Fischer Black - John Tooby - Leda Cosmides - Paul Rubin - Donald Rubin - Ronald Coase - Andrew Caplin See also | |||||||||
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